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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, governments in the western world resumed policy 
instruments from the immediate post-war period´s mixed economies. These instruments had 
all been abandoned in the liberalizing market economies of the last decades. How do we 
interpret these developments in the state’s role in modern economies? Will we witness the 
return of the interventionist state or are these rather short-term measures rescuing globalized 
and liberal market economies? By focusing on the  initial phase of crisis management between 
2008 and 2010 we analyse the three most important policy tools used of the financial crisis: 
state ownership of banks, fiscal stimuli and the regulation of financial markets. We observe a 
new capacity of the nation-state to intervene, going beyond mere firefighting, but also falling 
short of the classic interventionist state. Under the conditions of global markets, state 
intervention is shaped by the logic of competition for protecting national industries and the 
logic of cooperation necessary to come to international agreements. For the future, we expect 
states will retain their newly found powers to protect national business in the global 
economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Hertie School of Governance, Berlin 
Address: Friedrichstrasse 180, Berlin, 10117, Germany   
Email: hassel@hertie-school.org   
**     Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science, Free University of Berlin 
Address: Ihnestr. 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany  
Email: luetz@zedat.fu-berlin.de   
Balancing Competition and Cooperation 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
2. The Debate about the State before the Crisis ........................................ 4 
3. The State in the Financial Crisis (I): Rescue Operation, 
Nationalization, and Restructuring .................................................... 10 
4. The State in the Financial Crisis (II): Fiscal Stimuli and Budget 
Policy ......................................................................................................... 17 
5. The State in the Financial Crisis (III): Financial Regulation ............ 23 
6. The State in Global Capitalism .............................................................. 31 
References ....................................................................................................... 34 
 
 
 
Anke Hassel & Susanne Lütz 
1   
 
Balancing Competition and Cooperation: 
The State’s New Power in Crisis 
Management  
 
1. Introduction  
As a result of the financial crisis, the state has received a new lease of life. 
Nationalization, fiscal stimuli, and regulations of the financial markets are 
policies associated with another era. They are more compatible with the 
Keynesian welfare state as it existed from the 1950s to 1970s, than with the 
market fundamentalism of the 1990s. Against the backdrop of the Great 
Depression, the experience of World War II and the Cold War rivalry with the 
Eastern Bloc, it seemed that economic stability could be best achieved with 
demand management, strong regulatory state intervention and governmental 
provision of important infrastructural services, including comprehensive 
social security. The concept of a ‘mixed economy’ (Shonfield 1984), in which 
the state and the market played equal roles, became the catchword of the first 
three postwar decades.  
The winds shifted direction in the mid-1970s. All policy tools used in the 
mixed economy of the Keynesian welfare state were put to the test and found 
inadequate. Instead, privatization was thought to be the way to increase the 
productivity of state services. Demand management and demand-side 
policies were declared inflationary and replaced with supply-side economics. 
Restrictive monetary policy and financial markets were deregulated step by 
step. Together with the emerging countries and post-socialist transformation 
states, the Western industrial countries experienced a new thrust in economic 
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growth under the new supply-oriented and liberalized economic model. That 
is, until the financial crisis hit. 
Do government’s answers to the financial crisis herald the coming of a new 
model in the state-market relationship? Does the pendulum once again swing 
in the other direction? Is the mixed economy of the Keynesian welfare state 
being rehabilitated? Several authors see the opportunity for the role of the 
state to become more active. In a financial crisis, the state potentially gains a 
new capacity to act, in that it nationalizes, regulates, and reasserts its power 
over the economy (Dullien et al. 2009). A similar position is by Anatole 
Kaletsky, who describes a new configuration between the market and the 
state analogous to the Golden Age that followed World War II. After the 
laissez-faire of the 1920s, the New Deal of the early post-war period and the 
market fundamentalism of the 1980s and 1990s, we are about to see the 
advent of Capitalism 4.0:  
Market fundamentalist assumptions are being replaced by a more 
pragmatic understanding of macroeconomics. Policymakers are 
rediscovering the use of monetary policy to manage employment as 
well as inflation, of public spending to create jobs, of tax incentives to 
encourage investment and currencies to promote export growth 
(Kaletsky 2010). 
However, most of the voices discussing the consequences of the financial 
crisis for the state express far more skepticism. Many observers assume the 
state’s new capacity to act is only due to the imperative need to save 
capitalism (Streeck 2010; Crouch 2009). Since the market itself cannot create 
the institutional foundations on which operates, it is necessary for the state to 
intervene time and again. It is argued that, in a crisis, governments attempt 
desperately to reestablish market conditions in order to restore free reign to 
the market and private market actors. The privatization of the economic order 
and polities is said to have already advanced so far that the state’s primary 
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function is to distribute the costs of finance capitalism among taxpayers and 
further privatize the profits. In other words, the state’s new intervention 
directly serves private interests. This is – seemingly– reminiscent of the scope 
and abilities formerly ascribed to the Keynesian welfare state, though the 
effect is argued to be the opposite. Whereas the essence of the Keynesian 
welfare state was to act as the leveler among the various sectors of the 
population, in privatized Keynesianism (Crouch 2009), private consumption 
serves to re-stimulate the economy for the economic interests of proprietary 
classes. 
In the following section we ask how the role of the state has changed in the 
wake of governmental reactions to the financial crisis in the initial phase 
between 2008 and 2010. Using the three principal avenues of intervention 
available to the state – nationalization, fiscal policy, and regulation – we 
examine the state’s capability to act under the new conditions. We understand 
the capability to act as the capability to formulate, implement, and enforce 
political measures both within the state apparatus and, if necessary, against 
the interests of market actors. Although we are well aware the new 
government activities have been driven by the immediate necessity to act, we 
see signs indicating the adoption of a pragmatic approach toward 
interventionist policy tools that diminish the former ideologically colored 
reservations toward the state. In the course of the crisis, states have expanded 
their repertoire of instruments to manage the economy and, in this sense, 
gained ‘strength’. A more pragmatic approach in the use of state instruments 
is shaped by two factors. First, by the imperative to safeguard investments 
and competitive conditions in the dominant economic sectors of national 
economies (‘logic of competition’) and second by the necessity to cooperate 
and coordinate actions with other governments when intervening on a major 
scale into the market (‘logic of cooperation’). Both factors are a result of the 
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particular kind of globalization that has emerged in the last three decades. We 
argue that the two factors, the logic of competition and the logic of 
cooperation, limit governmental action in the three areas being studied here – 
nationalization, fiscal policy, and regulation. In all, our argument states that 
new hindrances resulting from the increasingly global political economy are 
working against governments’ attempts to manage the economy that exceeds 
the immediate rescue from the crisis.  
 
2. The Debate about the State before the Crisis 
Common to all more recent analyses of the state is the observation of a far-
reaching change in the relationship between the market and the state in the 
last three decades. The fact itself is not contested, but rather its theoretical 
classification and evaluation (Grande 2008). Prior to the financial crisis, the 
German debate dwelt on the transformation from a democratically 
institutionalized interventionist state (Zürn et al. 2004) with clear functions 
and authority, to one assuming a new function with regard to society and the 
market. At the international level, the new state was described as the 
‘Schumpeterian Workfare State’ (Jessop 2007), the ‘Competition State’ (Cerny 
2000), or the ‘Regulatory State’ (Majone 1997); yet no common terminology for 
this new type of statehood gained a permanent foothold. Just as rare, were 
indications that the transformation of the state was complete or the 
relationship between state and market had arrived at a new equilibrium. At 
the point when the financial crisis occurred, the state’s functions of economic 
regulation and responsibility were in flux. 
Considerably more consensus and continuity exists concerning what had 
constituted the ‘old’ interventionist state. This interventionist state of the post-
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war period had many avenues to intervene. It regulated markets and 
production processes, created human capital, infrastructure, and public 
services, corrected the distribution of income and social risks, and stabilized 
the fiscal course of the economy (Leibfried and Pierson 1995, 454ff.). Its 
economic activity covered nearly 50 percent of the gross social product of 
developed countries.  
Andrew Shonfield described postwar economies as ‘mixed economies’:  
A mixed economy is one in which prices and supplies of goods and 
services are largely determined by market processes. At the same 
time, the state and its agencies have a large capacity for economic 
intervention, which is used in an endeavor to secure objectives that 
the market would, it is believed, not achieve automatically or not fast 
enough to meet the requirements of public policy (1984, 3). 
In his book Modern Capitalism – The changing balance of public and private 
power Shonfield maintains the state’s role in ‘mixed economies’ exhibits the 
following five aspects (Shonfield 1965, 66-67): First, public authorities’ 
influence on the management of economic systems is vastly increased. This 
operates differently among countries, in one country the control of the 
banking system is decisive; in another it is part of a wide sector of publicly 
controlled enterprises. Second, rising public funds are made available to 
spend on public welfare or on Keynesian demand management. Third, 
governments engage in the  ‘taming’ of the market through public regulation 
and encouragement of long-range collaboration between firms. Fourth, 
economic policy includes an active industrial policy to promote research and 
development, and the training of workers. And finally, governments are open 
to long-range national planning, both inside government and in the private 
sector. 
The ‘degree of mixedness’ is not determined by the size of the public 
sector or the proportion of public expenditure to the national income. 
It is the function adopted by the state rather than its mass which 
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counts. Governments and their agencies intervene either to accelerate 
a market process, or to delay it, or to bias the market in a certain 
direction by means of subsidies or taxes or by direct regulation. States 
attempt to reduce the losses of output and welfare which are caused 
by fluctuations in private business sentiment and activity (Shonfield 
1984, 4). 
Mixed economies became the leading economic-political model after World 
War II partly because of the experiences of the Great Depression and the 
macroeconomic theory of Keynesianism. They were facilitated politically by 
the electoral success of socialist and social democratic governments, which 
implemented instruments of planned economy and nationalized key 
industries (e.g., French steel industry, Swedish shipbuilding). They viewed 
planning and nationalization as means to protect and support key national 
industries in economically unstable times (‘national champions’ strategy). The 
growing concentration of business and the oligopolistic structures in sectors 
such as the chemical, electronic and steel industries favored ‘mixed forums of 
coordination’ on middle-range planning and the corporatist exchange with 
strong unions. 
The OECD countries view of themselves as mixed economies ended with the 
advent of the oil crisis. Inflationary pressures could no longer be held in check 
by negotiated wage restraints. In the realm of economic theory, the insight 
became widely held that demand-side policies intensified the rise in prices, 
but had no effect on the production of goods or the national income. The state 
was classified as subsidiary and government action was said to be necessary 
only should markets fail completely. In short, all elements of mixed 
economies were discredited and successively discontinued. 
In place of state ownership and to protect key national industries, there 
ensued the privatization and deregulation of sectors close to the state, aiming 
to produce profits through greater efficiency. The state pulled back from its 
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role as provider. In many cases, this meant a renewed regulation of the sectors 
in which private companies were given specific access to formerly public 
utility companies. 
Where the welfare state had once guaranteed social security, now private 
providers entered the area of social politics by introducing capital-covered 
pensions and health insurance. New welfare state philosophies proposed a 
greater individualization of risks, the privatization of certain aspects or even 
entire branches of social security, and the change from passive instruments of 
labor market policy to activating measures. 
In fiscal policy, the predominant conviction became that a higher national 
income could be achieved primarily through structural reforms and improved 
conditions of supply. Instead of taming the market through regulation of 
competition and access, barriers in trade policy were dismantled and controls 
for the cross-border movement of capital were discontinued. It was thought 
that such simplification of cross-border investment would generate greater 
economic dynamics, which in turn would lead to a greater division of labor 
worldwide and to the opportunity for the specialization of national 
economies. 
However, the forced retreat of the state was not uniform everywhere. For 
example, the share of public expenditures in the gross national product of 
most countries hardly dropped. In the twenty-five years prior to the financial 
crisis, the percentage of state expenditures in the gross national product in the 
OECD actually rose on average.1 Despite the emphasis on supply-side 
economics, both private and public demand have tended to be sustained by 
public expenditures, tax breaks, increasing debt, and low interest rates. Even 
the privatization of public utility companies often did not mean a 
deregulation and decentralization of the market. 
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The transformation from a mixed economy to a selectively liberal market 
economy had far-reaching consequences for the function of the state. Even 
though the state continued to intervene during the phase of privatizing the 
mixed economy and used taxes, subsidies, and regulations to influence large 
areas of market activity, it no longer did this out of managerial interests. The 
state had lost any legitimacy as wanting to or being able to successfully 
manage the economy (Beckert 2009).  
Externally, the nation-state lost sovereignty to the European Union, 
international economic institutions, and other regimes that hindered national 
measures to restrict markets. The European project was aimed at creating 
markets, an aim that was forced forward by the special competences of the EU 
in competition policy or by the prominent role of the European Court of 
Justice. The GATT regulations impeded national trade limitations and 
subsidies. Regulative measures to ‘tame’ market actors had to be passed at the 
transnational and supranational levels (e.g. the regulation of privatized 
sectors involving infrastructure, telecommunications and electricity; the 
regulation of the financial sector). 
Internally, the state lost its capacity to impact market actors. Multi- and 
transnational enterprises used their exit options in order to avoid government 
policies that would increase their production costs. Under the conditions of 
open markets, Keynesian measures to stimulate demand did not seem 
practical, because they benefited foreign, instead of domestic, producers. In 
this respect, the maneuvering room for nation-states had already shrunk 
noticeably even before the financial crisis. 
What has happened to the state in the financial crisis? At first glance it is 
evident the state has again assumed many roles and functions that Shonfield 
described as characteristic for the post-war model of the mixed economy: the 
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state has pursued an enormous economic stabilization program with the help 
of expansive monetary and fiscal policies, has nationalized banks, and intends 
to extensively regulate banks and financial transactions. At the same time, 
government economic policy takes place in the new context of a global 
economy and liberalized markets. The mismatch between national political 
institutions and global markets shape the form and pattern of state 
intervention. There are two overriding concerns of national governments: 
First, the economic base of the national political economy as presented by 
domestic industries. Large domestic firms and industries are not only 
important employers and taxpayers, but also a highly organized political 
actor in the domestic arena. Governments have to protect the competitiveness 
of domestic industries vis-à-vis global competitors. In line with both 
neorealists (e.g. Drezner 2006) and advocates of liberal intergovernmentalism 
(e.g. Moravscik 1997) we assume that governments will prioritize measures 
that are in line with the preferences of dominant domestic industries and call 
this factor the ‘logic of competition’. Secondly, national policy measures are 
often ineffective when dealing with transnational and global business 
activities. Isolated national regulation can be avoided by off-shoring and 
national stimuli might have effects abroad but not domestically. Therefore, 
there is a necessity to synchronize  policy making with other states and 
international organizations in order to cope effectively with negative 
externalities. Following premises of liberal institutionalists (e.g. Krasner 1983) 
we call this requirement the ‘logic of cooperation’.  
The logic of competition and the logic of cooperation introduce contradictory 
elements in crisis management. National stimuli can protect domestic 
industries but at the same time be ineffective; similarly avoiding national 
regulation of financial services can protect domestic industries but not 
address global problems. On the other hand, international agreements on 
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banking regulation can have detrimental effects on domestic industries. 
Government intervention therefore has to weigh up domestic economic 
preferences against long term stabilization of markets and effective 
regulation.  
However, theoretically at least, the conflict between domestic preferences and 
international cooperation is not automatically decided in favour of domestic 
producers. Rather, domestic preferences shape the interaction and thereby 
close some policy-avenues. As participation in supranational policy-making 
increasingly becomes an end in itself for protecting domestic interests, 
governments can be expected to compromise in exchange with participation 
in decision-making.  
The subsequent sections will provide an analysis on the state responses in 
financial crisis with a particular focus on the state’s strategy with regard to 
the ownership of banks, fiscal policy and the regulatory policy of financial 
market with a focus on the period up to 2010. Based on three case studies, 
Germany, United Kingdom and the United states, the national strategies and 
implemented policy tools will be compared and evaluated. This will serve as 
an illustration of the two logics at play.   
 
3. The State in the Financial Crisis (I): Rescue Operation, 
Nationalization, and Restructuring 
The new ‘strength’ of the state is nowhere more evident than in bank bailouts, 
nationalization, and the conception of restructuring measures. According to 
calculations of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the volume of the 
financial sector rescue programs (consisting of capital injections to strengthen 
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banks’ capital bases, debt guarantees, purchases or guarantees of distressed or 
illiquid assets) in eleven Western industrial countries from September 2008 to 
July 2009 reached the unprecedented sum of 5,000 billion euro, of which 
capital injections and asset purchases or guarantees ‘only’ account for 451 
billion euro. Measured in absolute contributions, the financial rescue package, 
including debt guarantees, of the United States reached an unmatched sum of 
2,491 billion euro (= 22.3 % of GDP), followed by Great Britain with 845 billion 
euro (= 54% of GDP) and Germany with 700 billion euro (= 28.1% of GDP) 
(BIS 2009, 13). Because the need to coordinate action with other countries was 
relatively low in this area, the capacity of Western governments to act was 
comparably larger than in other areas, such as devising new measures of 
financial regulation. Moreover, in the beginning, questions concerning 
location competition did not yet influence governments’ actions. 
Governments intervened rather spontaneously and often under a time 
pressure when faced with the threat of bank failures, which in turn might 
cause chain reactions that would destabilize the financial sector and dry up 
sources of credit for business. 
By the time Josef Ackermann, CEO of the Deutsche Bank, called in March 
2008 for concerted action between governments, banks, and federal reserve 
banks saying, ‘I no longer believe in the market's self-healing power’ 
(Spiegelonline 18 March 2008), the state had already frequently appeared on 
the scene: in June 2007, the German state-owned development bank KfW and 
the bank federations came to the aid of the IKB, a German bank lending to 
small and medium-sized companies, with funds amounting to 8 billion euro. 
The governments of the federal states of Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia 
contributed to a million-euro package to shield their state banks Sachsen LB 
and WestLB from risks. In February 2008, the British mortgage bank Northern 
Rock was nationalized, making it the first British bank to become state owned 
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since 1975. The British state thereby assumed nearly 100 billion pounds in 
loans, mortgages, and guarantees (The House of Commons, 2008)) A month 
later, in March 2008, the US Federal Reserve Bank issued an emergency loan 
amounting to 29 billion dollars to the investment bank Bear Stearns through 
the intervention of JP Morgan. Hedge funds, other banks, and investors had 
emptied their Bear Stearns accounts and denied it new credit out of fear of the 
bank’s insolvency (Felton and Reinhart 2008, 188-193). 
National unilateral action to save jeopardized banks was the predominant 
response at the start of the crisis – a response, characterized by the motto 
‘each should put his own house in order’ according to the then German 
Minister of Trade and Industry Michael Glos, confirmed at the G7 summit in 
September 2008 (on the general argument, see also Hodson and Quaglia 2009; 
FAZ 23 September 2008). In the subsequent course of managing the crisis, 
countries reacted to one another with regard to the set-up of rescue 
operations. Many modeled their efforts on the rescue packages designed by 
the United States and Great Britain (see also Quaglia 2009 on the pioneering 
role of Great Britain in Europe), because they had not only the largest, but 
also the hardest hit financial markets. The British ‘Brown Plan’ and the 
American rescue package of October 2008, each amounting to about 500 
billion euro, consisted of capital injections, debt guarantees, and government 
investment/ownership in banks – measures that were duplicated to varying 
degrees in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Benelux countries in 
the fall of 2008. By the time the EU finance ministers agreed to raise the legal 
deposit insurance from 20,000 to 50,000 euro, to support banks relevant to the 
entire system, and to put a time limit on the rescue operations, there already 
existed a patchwork rug of national measures and bailout packages. Germany 
in particular had rejected French demands for the establishment of a 
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European rescue fund amounting to 300 billion euro, out of the fear it would 
become the main payer for all other countries (Handelsblatt 25 October 2008). 
Even though the national rescue packages were neither conceived, nor 
primarily implemented with competition over investments in mind, the 
consequences of state help on competition in the financial sectors of other 
countries were indeed discussed. The EU Commission was also critical of any 
possibility that the bailouts could subsidize competition. Following 
considerable criticism by the member states, especially Sweden and France, of 
the slow pace with which billions of aid were being allocated, the 
Commission began to harmonize, step by step, the aid schemes for 
government capital injections into the banking sector. They then demanded 
higher interest payments from needy banks than from basically healthy 
banks, for whom the financial injections were only used to spur bank lending 
(Handelsblatt 9 December 2008). 
The aim of the rescue packages was to re-establish trust among the banks in 
order to revive inter-bank trade and ensure the flow of credit to businesses. 
To implement the bank bailout, new institutions were created, namely: the 
Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, FMSA) in Germany in October 2008, the Public 
Investment Corporation in the United States in March 2009, and the UK 
Financial Investments Ltd in Great Britain in November 2009. The respective 
governments provided the seed money for these institutions, which were 
usually institutionally bound to their respective finance ministry, though their 
legal structures varied. The manner in which these funds were allocated 
reflects the different aims and traditions of each country: whereas the 
American government bailed out the banks with financial support, so that 
these firms would buy up beleaguered competitors and the domestic banking 
sector would be stabilized through mergers, the French rescue plan revealed 
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traditions of industrial policy and investment control (FAZ 1 November 2008). 
In October 2008, the six largest French financial institutions drew 10.5 billion 
euro from the government’s rescue funds under considerable pressure from 
the French government. The capital injection was granted under the condition 
that the volume of credit to enterprises, communities, and consumers would 
be increased (Xiao 2009)  
The German rescue package differs from those of the United States, Great 
Britain and France, particularly with regard to the matter of the voluntary or 
obligatory acceptance of aid, as well as the willingness of the government to 
bail out faltering banks on the condition of receiving bank stock. In the United 
States, Great Britain and France, governments exerted sometimes soft and 
other times massive pressure to ensure that public funds were accepted by the 
largest bank in each country, because it was considered the most relevant to 
the health of the financial sector. To guard against credit risks, banks in Great 
Britain were required by the government to prove they had raised their core 
capital ratio to 9 percent; otherwise they were forced to accept government 
help (IMF 2011, 54). The United States and Great Britain actively expanded 
state ownership of suffering banks by purchasing non-voting preferred 
shares, with the view that future profits from dividend payments would 
eventually flow back into the state treasury and thereby to taxpayers (Tigges 
2008). The Financial Market Stabilization Fund set up in Germany in October 
2008, with a value of 400 billion euro, offered state aid on a voluntary basis. In 
principle, the money was available to every bank, not just those relevant to 
the entire financial system, with the aim to avoid any possible ‘distortion to 
competition’. State investment followed in the form of non-participating 
shareholding, instead of share acquisition, in which the state retained a say 
regarding dividend payments, managerial salaries, and the business policies 
of the banks in question. In the public discussion, concerns about the legality 
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of the growing state ownership in the banking sector were expressed at a 
point when the major financial institutions were already partly nationalized 
in the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. German banks were 
hesitant to take advantage of government help, and largely requested state 
guarantees instead of injections of capital from the rescue funds. Following 
the rescue of Länder banks, the Commerzbank was the first private big bank to 
apply for state funds in the form of non-participating shareholding (until 
January 2009 to a sum of 18.2 bn. euro), while Deutsche Bank’s CEO 
Ackermann said “I would be ashamed if we were to take state money during 
this crisis”  (Dempsey 2008). Germany found the issue of nationalization a 
more difficult one than did other countries and it was not until bankruptcy 
threatened the Munich real-estate financer HypoRealEstate (HRE) that the 
government was prepared to ignore regulatory concerns. By October 2008, it 
was clear that the HRE could only be saved from immediate insolvency if it 
was guaranteed 35 billion euro from the federal government and a loan of 15 
billion euro from another financial institution. In early 2009, the 
nationalization of those financial institutions deemed relevant to the entire 
financial system seemed inevitable in view of further bank losses on their 
investments in the American real estate market. When the investor J. C. 
Flowers refused to sell his HRE shares to the federal government, the 
government saw itself forced to create a legal basis for expropriation. With the 
passage of the Financial Market Stabilization Extension Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungs-Ergänzungsgesetz) by the Bundestag in the spring of 
2009, expropriations with compensation were only possible in regulatory law 
if the stability of the financial sector could be ensured in this manner. The 
federal government can, in such cases, also become the majority shareholder 
even against the will of the of the shareholders convention (IMF 2011, 12). 
Starting in mid-2009, the question of restructuring faltering banks moved into 
the spotlight of international debate. The discussion was sparked by the 
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question whether, from the view of the taxpayer, it would be desirable to save 
precisely those banks that were said to be ‘too big to fail’ and whether the 
government, by assuming private risks, did not provide banks with new 
incentives to undertake moral hazards. In the meantime, the opinion in many 
countries was to allow banks or other enterprises to go bankrupt on the 
condition that the risks involved are shared by market actors and the state. An 
institutional innovation introduced in many countries was that of ‘bad banks’. 
Banks transfer ‘toxic’ equities and thereby purge their portfolios of non-
performing loans. In Germany, the passage of the ‘Financial Market 
Stabilization Continuation Act’ (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung) in July 2009 laid the groundwork for the 
establishment of bad banks. The HRE was the first German bank to avail itself 
of this new institution. (Kröger 2010). 
In connection with the possible threat of bank insolvency, many countries are 
witnessing an increased willingness to grant the state far-reaching powers to 
intervene in the property rights of financial institutions during a crisis. In 
November 2010, the German parliament accepted the ‘Restructuring Act’ 
(Restrukturierungsgesetz) that gives financial authorities the right in an 
emergency to close a bank, sell and transfer parts of the bank ‘too big to fail’ 
to a state ‘bridge bank’ (Brückenbank) and to liquidate parts with greater risk 
exposure. The cost is to be carried by a restructuring fund that is financed by 
an obligatory ‘bank levy’, the sum of which is determined by the size of the 
bank and the riskiness of the types of business it does. The new fund will be 
managed by the ‘Financial Market Stabilization Agency’ 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt (FMSA) which also oversees the bad banks. 
(Kißler 2010; Bundesfinanzministerium 2010). Both in the United States and in 
Canada banking regulators expect the nation’s largest financial firms to draw 
up ‘living wills’ showing how they would be dismantled in a crisis without 
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the need for a government bailout. The new Dodd-Frank law gives US federal 
regulators new power to seize and break up faltering mega-firms that pose a 
threat to the stability of the entire financial system (McGrane and Zibel 2011). 
Through these measures the state has expanded its repertoire of actions 
available when dealing with the banking sector. 
 
4. The State in the Financial Crisis (II): Fiscal Stimuli and 
Budget Policy 
Following the immediate action to combat the financial crisis, fiscal policy 
became the second area in which the state intervened in the economy on a 
massive scale. The threat of banks folding reduced the flow of credit to 
private firms, unnerved the market players and led directly to drops in 
private demand. The governments of the OECD countries reacted to this 
primarily with fiscal programs designed to hold overall steady demand. 
These measures came in the form of tax breaks, subsidies for employees and 
companies, investment programs and the strengthening of automatic 
stabilizers. In monetary policy, the central banks stimulated the overall 
economic demand by increasing the amount of money in circulation and 
lowering prime interest rates.  
Compared with the guarantees made by the state to save the banks, the fiscal 
programs put into place were modest: the German stimulus plans I and II 
totaled about 60 billion euro, representing less than 10 percent of the funds 
used to bail out the banking sector. According to estimates included in the 
joint fiscal analysis and prognosis by leading German economic research 
institutes, the sum of all fiscal policy measures for 2009 totalled about 1.3 
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percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 1.8 percent in 2010 (Roos 2009, 
400). 
In the area of fiscal policy, the United States also stands out ahead, both in 
absolute and relative terms. In 2008, the US Congress passed a fiscal stimulus 
program amounting to 100 billion euro. Immediately following his election, 
US President Obama issued the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
which contained fiscal policy measures worth more than 600 billion euro, 
(Spiegelonline 10 February 2009) followed by another 100 billion euro stimulus 
program in the fall of 2010 (Financial Times 8 September 2010). Great Britain, 
however, implemented a stimulus package equaling 1.9 percent of its GDP, 
which places it behind the German package of 3.2 percent of GDP. Germany’s 
contribution also puts it in the middle field among OECD countries. 
The importance of fiscal policy measures is indeed controversial. Although 
there was consensus concerning the necessity of initial measures to stabilize 
demand, today the debate in nearly all countries foreshadows budget 
consolidation.2 In light of the fact that national debt is skyrocketing to levels 
previously reached only during military conflict and is projected to reach 
thoroughly unprecedented levels in the future, the leeway open to 
governments to stimulate demand is limited by the negative effects of 
potential over-indebtedness. It is estimated that the debt level of most OECD 
countries has risen by a third in the course of the financial crisis and, on 
average, already equals 100 percent of the GDP (ECB 2010, Financial Times 23 
September 2009). The commitments of the German federal government to 
save the banks and the expenditures for the fiscal stimulus program, when 
combined, equal just about 30 percent of the German national debt, which 
stands currently at 1.7 trillion euro. The latitude to act available to the state is 
primarily determined by the pull between stimulating demand and the 
conditions to refinance, specifically, the necessity to consolidate the budget.3 
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Beyond this fundamental debate over stimulation versus consolidation, it 
becomes evident in fiscal policy how the state’s new role is influenced by 
competition over investments and the necessity to cooperate. Both directly 
linked to one another. Since the about-face in economic policy by the 
Mitterrand government in 1982, it has been apparent that fiscal programs 
cannot be limited to national economies, in a world where the economy is 
global (Hall 1986). Whether governments increase overall demand directly via 
state spending or indirectly through tax breaks or tax bonuses, both can lead 
to a demand for products from abroad and thereby stimulate production in 
other countries. Thus, fiscal programs to overcome global recessions have a 
free rider problem. Small open economies profit from fiscal policy measures 
less than large economies and therefore have a smaller interest in fiscal 
stimuli. Since fiscal programs should be both fast and large, according to the 
consensus among economists (Roos 2009), there is a need to coordinate fiscal 
policy particularly among smaller countries, so that the impact of the 
measures will be a great as possible. Thus, cooperation is not a condition for 
the implementation of fiscal policy measures, but certainly a factor 
influencing their effectiveness. 
Additionally, national governments are tempted to support the competitive 
advantage of their own economies through various other measures in order to 
use the crisis to better position their competitive sectors on the world markets. 
As a result, tensions arise for governments between the need to coordinate 
efforts in fiscal policy and the hesitancy to pursue a fiscal policy that benefits 
their trade partners.  
These limitations are visible in the reactions of governments to the financial 
crisis. The Bush administration reacted to the looming recession in February 
2008 by issuing consumer bonuses totaling 75 billion euro (Politi 2008). The 
British government presented a 20 billion pound fiscal stimulus package on 
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25 November 2008 (Bertrand, Hall, and Pickard 2008) and Presidential 
candidate Obama called in the fall of 2008 for a fiscal stimulus program of 
over 500 billion euro. The economic performance of both countries was 
immediately affected by the crash of the financial sector. Since the imminent 
recession was a global one, the British and American governments assumed 
the effects of stimulation would be all the greater with the number of 
countries that followed their lead. 
However, the view outside the financial centers was a different one. The 
German economy was hit by the crisis relatively late. The economic prognoses 
still remained optimistic until the fall of 2008. The German Council of 
Economic Experts had forecast a growth of 1.8 percent for 2008 and 
stagnation for 2009 (SVR 2008). This supported Finance Minister Steinbrück’s 
conclusion that the crisis was an American problem. If no economic crisis hit 
Germany, no German fiscal stimulus program would be necessary. However, 
in the final quarter of 2008, the German economy began to shrink. In early 
2009, first exports and then the economic output of producing industries 
dropped massively. Thus, it became clear the recession had reached Germany 
by way of the sudden collapse in demand from abroad. In 2009, the German 
economy shrunk more than that of the Anglo-Saxon countries, which were 
considered the perpetrators of the crisis. Despite the warnings from other 
countries and the international calls for action, the German federal 
government had only acted the moment the crisis reached German soil. From 
then on, the government passed two fiscal stimulus packages, the first on 5 
November 2008 for 11.8 billion euro and the second on 27 January 2009 for 
nearly 50 billion euro. 
At the same time, fiscal policy was also conducted as industrial policy. Unlike 
the liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, the German manufacturing sector is based 
on specifically qualified skilled workers. The drop in business in the 
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manufacturing industries would have led to massive layoffs, but these could 
be avoided by extending and broadening the short-time allowance (at a cost 
of 6 billion euro). In addition to tax relief, increases in current transfer 
payments, numerous write-offs, state investment and special measures were 
enacted to support the automobile industry: car tax was lowered and the 
scrapping premium created a direct demand for new, if not exclusively 
German-produced, cars. The scrapping premium was so popular that its total 
budget was expanded in April 2009 from 1.5 to 5 billion euro (Deggerich et al. 
2009). In July 2009, a similar yet smaller scrapping premium, ‘Cash for 
Clunkers’ was introduced in the United States with the aim of supporting the 
American automobile industry (Economic Report of the President 2010, 54). 
More extensive consumption-oriented measures, such as consumer bonuses 
or the reduction of the value-added tax for a limited period, found no 
advocates in rather consumption-weak Germany. However, in Great Britain, 
it is estimated that the reduction of the value-added tax had an impact, 
gauged by additional turnover in the retail business, totaling more than 2 
billion pounds. In Germany, relief measures were geared a far greater degree 
toward the need and interests of the manufacturing industries and their 
employees. 
Immediately following the passage of the German stimulus package, the 
federal government once again hit the brakes. In preparation for the G20 
summit held in London in early April 2009, the United States advocated 
additional coordinated fiscal programs and was backed by the British 
government. In the Financial Times, Obama’s chief economic advisor, Larry 
Summers, called for a continued worldwide stimulation of the economy 
(Freeland and Luce 2009). His call was answered with a clear refusal by 
Europeans at the EU summit in late March 2009 (Spiegelonline 9 March 2009). 
Governments could not agree on a common course of action at the global or 
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European level. At the Pittsburg summit in September 2009, the G20 nations 
agreed to the following statement: 
We pledge today to sustain our strong policy response until a durable 
recovery is secured. We will act to ensure that when growth returns, 
jobs do too. We will avoid any premature withdrawal of stimulus. At 
the same time, we will prepare our exit strategies and, when the time 
is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a cooperative 
and coordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal 
responsibility (Wolf 2010). 
However, since the middle of 2009 the debate has increasingly shifted away 
from the topic of stimulation to that of consolidation. In the statement issued 
at the G20 summit in Toronto, governments committed themselves to cut 
their deficits by half by 2013 and to reduce, or at least stabilize, the debt share 
of their national incomes by 2016.  
The change of government in Great Britain in May 2010 led to the 
implementation of a radical austerity program, which prescribed cutbacks of 
25 percent until 2014 in most ministerial portfolios (Giles and Pimlott 2010). In 
Germany, the grand coalition resorted as early as May 2009 to the ‘debt brake’ 
as an institutional mechanism to avoid further debt. In this context, the 
German federal government announced in the summer of 2010 its plan to 
implement a comprehensive austerity package equaling 80 billion euro, in 
light of robust export figures and unexpectedly high growth rates 
(Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011, 15). 
In the United States the focus remained on fiscal stimulation until the mid-
term elections in November 2010, which was mainly due to the persisting 
poor economic performance. Since then, pressure towards budget 
consolidation has been on the top of the political agenda. In spring 2011, the 
government had to find political support for the decision to raise the debt 
ceiling of 14.3 trillion US dollar. The negotiations laid open deep and 
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intensified political and ideological conflicts over the size of government and 
fiscal policy (Calmes 2011).  
It thus becomes clear, like fiscal stimuli, budget consolidation policy is subject 
to free rider problems. The process of reducing debt burden in one country 
affects other countries’ economies. Moreover, in the Eurozone there is the 
added factor that in the past, economically weak and indebted countries have 
profited from the solvency of competitive regions. In order to distribute the 
burden of consolidation on all shoulders, more efforts towards cooperation 
are expected. 
 
5. The State in the Financial Crisis (III): Financial 
Regulation 
The financial sector was not unregulated terrain before the financial crisis. 
With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the globalization of the 
finance business in the 1980s, however, a type of dialectic process took place 
involving market development, bank collapse or regional crises (e.g., debt 
crisis in Latin America in the 1980s, the Asian crisis of 1998/99), and 
subsequent re-regulation. The crises came about not the least because banks 
exploited loopholes in the regulatory net (sometimes with the quiet toleration 
of politics). Countries reacted by pursing multilateral cooperation  to expand 
the range of risk-limiting regulation and thereby deprive banks of ways to 
escape regulatory constraints. Hence, compared with the fields of rescue 
operations or fiscal stimuli, states exhibited a substantial amount of 
intergovernmental collaboration in financial regulation since the mid-1970s. 
After the bankruptcy of the Herstatt Bank and the closure of the Franklin 
National Bank in 1974, institutions and instruments of finance market 
Balancing Competition and Cooperation 
 24
regulation at the national, European and global levels were expanded after 
every major financial crisis (for a historical overview, see Lütz 2009). Even 
before the current crisis, the ability of nation-states to regulate financial 
markets was determined chiefly by the need to coordinate regulatory 
standards with other states. Matters involving regulation had always 
broadened out beyond the banking sector to include securities and insurance 
businesses, as well as, issues concerning international payment transactions, 
accounting standards and corporate governance. 
Prior to the current crisis, finance market regulation was discussed in an 
international, institutionally fragmented, yet exclusive, network made up of 
international organizations (IMF, World Bank), nation-state representatives 
(G7 finance ministers, regulatory authorities, central bank governors) and an 
increasing number of international peak organizations and actors who 
‘interface’ between the national, European and global levels (e.g. Financial 
Stability Forum, FSF) (see also Helleiner and Pagliari 2010). The regulations 
developing out of this network were primarily of a ‘soft law’ character, 
meaning that their effectiveness depended on the transposition into national 
or European law. Simultaneously – and this highlights a key dilemma in this 
area – the international negotiations on security standards always expressed 
policy preferences regarding the protection of national firms. Every 
government sought to avoid strengthening regulatory constraints that would 
put its own national finance sector at a disadvantage in international 
competition. As a result, the standards agreed upon reflect a consensus based 
on the ‘smallest common denominator’ and often represent the success of 
national or international bank lobbying (e.g., the G30 or the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF). Therefore it is not surprising to find that in the last 
ten to fifteen years regulatory tasks have increasingly been delegated to 
private market actors – visible in the regulation of derivatives, hedge funds, 
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rating agencies, accounting standards and especially the setting of capital 
adequacy standards for banks (Basel II). Regulatory jurisdiction has been 
turned over to private bodies (e.g. accounting) and regulation has occurred 
through nonbinding ‘codes of best practices’ (hedge funds, derivatives, rating 
agencies). Also the content of regulation (such as the calculation of and 
safeguarding against credit risk) were defined by the banks and the 
supervision left essentially to market mechanisms (Basel II). All in all, it is the 
concurrency of cooperation logic and location logic that definitively limits the 
ability of each individual nation-state to take action in this area. As will be 
shown, this has not changed in the current financial crisis. Two trends 
characterize current regulation activity: first, the content of regulation is being 
expanded and combined with public jurisdiction in areas that were 
previously regulated privately or not at all; second, the institutional 
architecture of financial oversight is being strengthened, which is the 
manifestation of a new regulation philosophy and is associated with the 
reorganization of the regulatory structure. 
Since the fall of 2008, the progress in regulating financial markets has been 
essentially determined by the decisions reached at G20 summits, which have 
replaced the G7 summits as the platform for international cooperation 
(Alexandroff and Kirton 2010). The network of states and domain experts, 
which had previously focused on the circle of Western industrial countries, 
has been broadened during the course of dealing with the crisis to include the 
‘emerging markets’ (especially China, India, and Brazil, BRIC). This 
development reflects the changed power relations within the global economy. 
Basic guidelines for regulating financial markets are now decided at G20 
summits; the translation of these guidelines into specific technical 
formulations is then delegated to expert panels (such as the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, also expanded to include representatives from 
Balancing Competition and Cooperation 
 26
emerging markets), the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) as the international association of organizations regulating securities, 
and especially the Financial Stability Board (FSB, previously known as the 
Financial Stability Forum) as a body at the interface of oversight agencies and 
international organizations. At the first crisis summit in November 2008, the 
G20 pledged to continue to open capital markets and trade relations; though, 
it was also stated that the group aimed to ensure the regulation of ‘every 
market, every market participant and every financial product”. As far as the 
details of the reform proposals are concerned, the G20 at first pursued a 
‘roadmap’ worked out by the FSB, based on the work of other regulatory 
bodies. The main topics on the list of sixty recommended actions were the 
regulation of derivatives, hedge funds, rating agencies, and especially the 
reform of capital adequacy standards for banks (Basel II) with the goal to 
increase fundamentally the capital cushion and to protect capital by basing it 
less on market and risks and thereby making it procyclical (Helleiner and 
Pagliari 2009, 7-8). 
Before the financial crisis, derivatives were considered in the United States to 
be financial innovations that expressed the securitization of financial 
relations, made the relations between lenders and borrowers tradable in 
obligatory law, and thereby dispersed risk among many market actors. The 
lack of transparency surrounding complexly intermingled products with 
unclear risks and unknown implications for other market actors was 
underscored over the course of the crisis. In the United States, the regulation 
of the derivative business became one of the first topics tackled by the Obama 
administration in May 2009. The United States and the EU decided to subject 
the trade in derivatives to government oversight (performed in the EU by the 
new European Securities and Market Authority, ESMA) and to move the so-
called ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) business back to organized markets like stock 
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exchanges and registered trading platforms. A type of clearinghouse is to act 
as a ‘counterparty’ and thus as a mediator between buyers and sellers 
(Helleiner and Pagliari 2010; Grant 2010).  
Proposals put forth by Germany, France and the EU Commission on the 
regulation of hedge funds had been rejected by the United States and Great 
Britain, the key centers of this financial business. Now there is growing 
discussion on the systemic character and the procyclical-leaning, crisis-
enhancing effect of the hedge fund business. In the meantime, it has been 
decided in the United States and the EU to regulate this field in the sense of 
registering and publicizing business information, a task for which 
supervisory bodies are responsible. However, conflict arose between Great 
Britain, the United States and the rest of the EU over the use of the EU 
‘Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’ (AIFM), which member 
states agreed upon in the spring of 2010 against the wishes of Great Britain. 
Hedge funds originating in third countries are only allowed to do business in 
the EU if they have an ‘EU passport’ that requires them to uphold European 
regulations. This is interpreted by the United States as a potentially 
protectionist measure that represents a de facto market ban for American 
funds (Peel 2010).  
With regard to the regulation of rating agencies, the United States proves to 
be much more hesitant than the EU, probably because the leading agencies 
worldwide have the bulk of their business in the United States. The EU was 
determined to regulate in 2009; in the wake of the imminent bankruptcy of 
Greece and the role that ratings of Greek government bonds were thought to 
play in heating up the crisis, further steps were taken in June 2010. It was 
planned to subordinate rating agencies to the supervision of the new 
institution ESMA, which has more responsibilities than registration alone. 
Additionally, this regulatory authority should have the power to issue 
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monetary penalties, demand business records and conduct interrogations 
(Kafsack 2010a). 
The so-called Basel Capital Adequacy Standard represents one of the most 
important regulations to contain financial risks. Since the 1980s, the standard 
has been the focus of negotiations among central bank governors and 
regulators in the Basel Committee, which is affiliated with the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). The Basel II standard, valid prior to the crisis, 
allows banks to calculate risks and the amount of capital they must place in 
reserve on the basis of their own models of calculation or ratings. In addition, 
Basel II was not implemented by American investment banks. Criticism of the 
standard arose fairly quickly and charged that it was procyclical in nature and 
that the equity ratio of the standard was too low overall (Porter 2010, 64-65). 
In September 2010, the Basel Committee agreed on the new Basel III standard, 
which was ratified by the member countries of the G20 in Seoul in November 
2010. According to this standard, the minimum requirement for common 
equity will be raised considerably and will be further expanded by the 
introduction of new capital buffers. The common equity should only be made 
up of shares and retained earnings, while the non-participating shareholding 
so important in Germany, or public funds, will become less important for 
securing against risk (BIS 2010). It is not surprising that Germany views these 
rules as disadvantageous for its own banking system and opposed them to 
the very end. It was decided to grant a long transition phase (until 2019) to 
give banks the chance to cover their capital needs (Handelsblatt 7 September 
2010; Frühauf 2010; Enrich and Paletta 2010). In contrast, no consensus exists 
at the G20 level on the issues of introducing a financial market transaction tax 
and a bank levy, neither of which could be implemented due to the resistance 
of Canada and the BRIC countries, among others (Beattie 2010). Even though 
the international community is still far from attaining the goal of creating a 
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security net without loopholes, there are indications that regulatory progress 
is being made in many key issues, due primarily to the change in preferences 
expressed by the United States and Great Britain.  
As was the case in earlier crises, the expansion of the architecture of financial 
institutions is part of the crisis management. Once again, the United States 
and Great Britain have assumed a pioneering function. The reorganization of 
regulatory responsibilities is highly influenced by a new philosophy of 
regulation, which no longer places the job of securing against risk solely at the 
microlevel of each individual bank but seeks to scrutinize more closely the 
interactions between various market sectors and financial institutions, and, in 
turn, the system risks (‘macro-prudential regulation’). This is linked to the 
expansion and transfer of supervisory functions to the central banks and to 
the establishment of new coordinating bodies to deal with systemic risks at 
the European level (European Systemic Risk Board, ESRB) and at the global 
level (transformation of the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial 
Stability Board, FSB). In June 2010, Great Britain transferred not only the 
oversight of systemic financial risks to the Bank of England, but also the 
responsibility for the regulation of the City of London (Handelsblatt 23 June 
2010). 
In the United States, the job of regulating systemic risks was given to the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was created by the 
Dodd-Franck Act of July 2010 and is made up of representatives from the 
most important regulatory bodies and located and chaired by the Treasury 
Department. In addition to concerns over systemic risks, consumer protection 
issues moved to the center of finance market regulations. Both the United 
States and Great Britain have established new consumer protection agencies 
that assume some of the tasks of the previous banking authority, or like the 
American Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, deal specifically with 
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controlling the mortgage markets. Institutionally, new ground is being broken 
in the United States because the new authorities are not subordinate to an 
independent regulatory agency like the SEC or to the Executive branch, but 
answer instead to the US Federal Reserve Bank (Wallison 2010). In Germany, 
the introduction of a new consumer protection agency is not officially being 
discussed; however, demands by consumer organizations for the right to 
appeal to the financial regulatory authorities, and by investor associations for 
the creation of a ‘FinanzTÜV’ (government-issued certification) for all 
financial products shows the increased importance of investor protection after 
the crisis. In sum, much speaks for the emergence of a new trend to separate 
supervision and control over the behavior of market actors (conduct 
regulation) from the classic oversight over financial institutions and their risk 
portfolios (prudential regulation) (Masters and Parker 2010).  
At the European level it is becoming evident that a supranationalization of 
regulatory responsibilities over the financial markets is taking hold, as was 
long and repeatedly rejected especially by Germany and Great Britain. In 
September 2010, EU member states agreed to set up three European 
regulatory agencies, one for banks (EBA), one for securities and stock 
exchanges (ESMA) and one for insurances (EIOPA). These build on the three 
existing European expert committees and commenced their work in January 
2011. The new agencies are not to replace national oversight, but they do have 
the right to intervene in conflicts between national bodies, directly enact 
standards for credit institutions and markets and ban risky financial products. 
In cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), that represents 
the ECB and the presidents of the twenty-seven national central banks, the 
new regulatory agencies are to set up an ‘early warning system’ for systemic 
dangers (Kafsack 2010b). Though the process of institution building is 
certainly incomplete, the number of new regulatory responsibilities indicates, 
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of all institutions involved, the central banks are clearly the winners of the 
crisis. At least on the national level, their importance has increased at the cost 
of the disempowerment of pre-existing banking regulatory bodies. They had 
to relinquish some responsibilities to the European level and some to the new 
consumer protection authorities, making these regulatory bodies the apparent 
losers of the crisis. The one certain winner is expert bureaucracy as a whole. 
 
6. The State in Global Capitalism 
The rescue of capitalism in the financial crisis has placed the state once again 
at the hub of economic policy management. In the Western industrial 
countries, the state demonstrated power and the ability to act. Governments 
passed legislation, sometimes using fast-track procedures that had 
extraordinary consequences for their national budgets, intervened in the 
property rights of banks and other firms and completely reorganized financial 
regulations. The acceleration of decision making processes was usually 
accompanied by a strengthening of the executive branch of government. In all 
Western industrial countries, new institutions (regulatory authorities, bank-
rescue and restructuring funds) were established and the bureaucracy 
involved in regulating financial markets was expanded during the course of 
the crisis. It remains to be seen whether the strengthening of the state 
apparatus will continue to reinforce the top-heaviness of the decision making 
process favoring executive branch of government, as was evident in the crisis 
management, or whether, over time, this will once again give way to 
established modes of politics and policy. 
An important finding of our analysis is that Germany, found it exceptionally 
difficult to recognize the necessity of economic policy action in the crisis. The 
United States and Great Britain were more willing to intervene faster and 
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deeper into the market and property rights of investors and enterprises. The 
deeply rooted tradition of ordo-liberalism in German ministerial bureaucracy 
(evident in the hesitation of the state to invest in failing banks or in the 
voluntary acceptance of rescue funds) as well as a restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy could hardly be reconciled with the intervention in the 
market economy necessary in the crisis. 
By opening the toolbox and applying the ‘mixed economy’ tools found 
inside– namely, nationalization, fiscal policy and market-limiting regulation – 
nation-states today have expanded their repertoire of management tools 
compared to the period of market liberalization. Ideological taboos were 
broken and dogmas seemingly fortified by academically backed economics 
were weakened. The necessity of government oversight and management in 
essential economic areas is once again no longer questioned. The state after 
the financial crisis is no longer the same as it was before the crisis. However, 
the conditions framing government action today are fundamentally different 
from those existing in the heyday of the mixed economy. In all of the policy 
fields we examined, there was a close relationship between the logic of 
competition and the logic of cooperation. Nation-states in global capitalism 
are subjected to overwhelming constraints. Their interventions in the 
economy influence the investment decisions of firms and thus the 
competitiveness of their own economies. At the same time, many measures 
can no longer be implemented by a single government; instead, regulations 
and stimulus programs are dependent on the decisions made in other 
countries. As a result, economic and regulative interdependence are the 
essential conditions of government action. Precisely because the economic 
interdependence of government action is limited, it is possible the state will 
retain the recently obtained tools as means to implement economic policy.
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1
 Data from the OECD shows the share of government expenditure in most countries has 
stagnated, but not that it has been reduced to any great degree (Schäfer 2009).  
2 High debt levels prevent the effective implementation of fiscal policy instruments, or more 
specifically, they increase future costs. The uncertainties over the creditworthiness of 
governments then replace the uncertainty over the liquidity of banks on the part of market 
players. There is a danger that the long-term interest for government bonds will rise if private 
investors judge the risk of insolvency to be greater. In particular, the assumption of economists 
pertaining to the expected growth rates of the developing countries and the trust of investors in 
the budget policy of the OECD countries determine the various positions. Financial Times, IMF 
Warns on Global Recovery, 8 July 2010. See also Reinhardt and Rogoff (2010) and Blanchard et 
al. (2010). 
3 On the discussion about the impact of over-indebtedness on limiting the state’s ability to act for 
the United States, see Hacker and Pierson (2006), and for Germany, Streeck (2010) and Streeck 
and Mertens (2010). 
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